This plan can be frustrated, however, so long as Washington and Europe can hold fast against Russian bullying and maintain Ukrainian military pressure on the ground. All this, he hopes, will set the stage for a sustainably frozen conflict or a negotiated settlement generous enough to let him claim a victory. His new recruits will stabilize the battlefield, the pace of military operations will slow, his threats of escalation will scare everybody, and Western opposition to the war will increase as high energy prices and inflation bite. It is possible to get Moscow to do the same today.ĭespite the problems he faces, Putin seems to think that if he can hold on until winter, all will be well. Bluster, bombing, and nuclear saber rattling didn’t work then, and eventually, Washington accepted reality and withdrew from the conflict. Now that Moscow has run into trouble, the Kremlin’s anger in the face of defeat is also familiar, resembling how the Nixon administration approached the Vietnam War half a century ago. Those problems are hardly unique to Russia, having marked many U.S. Early in the war, Moscow’s effort was plagued by ignorance, overconfidence, and bad planning.
Many attribute this behavior to uniquely terrifying characteristics of Putin and his regime and argue that the West should force Ukraine to give in, lest the war escalate to terrifying new levels of carnage and destruction. After Ukrainian military successes this fall, Putin has ordered the hasty mobilization of several hundred thousand more troops, orchestrated sham referendums in occupied areas to formally incorporate them into Russia, issued increasingly explicit nuclear threats, and launched a wave of missile strikes across Ukraine.
Russian President Vladimir Putin has responded to recent military setbacks with defiance.
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